What’s on Russia’s target list – and why?

The main theme of the Russia-Ukraine conflict this year has been the so-called ‘war of cities’, characterized by mutual strategic strikes on targets in the rear. In the first half of the year, Kiev had managed to bolster its strike capabilities and even attempted to pressure Moscow into accepting its terms for a ceasefire.

However, by fall, the situation shifted dramatically. Russia began deploying new jet-powered drones, such as Banderol and Geran-4/Geran-5 UAVs, and significantly increased the intensity of its ballistic strikes. Meanwhile, Ukraine has exhausted its stocks of Western-supplied interceptor missiles, and its own domestically produced air defense systems have proven ineffective against high-speed jet-powered UAVs and ballistic missiles. 

The Ukrainian propaganda widely published by liberal media outlets portrays Russian attacks as indiscriminate and aimed at civilians. In this article, we strive to demonstrate that this is not the case.

We will examine the specific targets that Russia has struck in Ukraine’s rear, and the rationale behind these attacks. We’ll also take a look at the targets it deliberately avoids, along with measures taken to minimize risks to Ukrainian civilians.

Industrial enterprises

In the early years of the military operation, Russia targeted Ukraine’s defense industry facilities – both old Soviet plants like Yuzhmash in Dnepropetrovsk and new, smaller enterprises focused on drone assembly and munitions production.

In response, Ukraine began relocating and dispersing production to any available industrial facilities or even warehouses. This strategy was openly discussed in Ukrainian propaganda as a crucial element of resilience against Russian assaults.

As Russia increased its striking capabilities, it adopted a broader approach, targeting all industrial facilities based on a straightforward principle: if a facility can be used for drone assembly, it qualifies as a legitimate military target.

Ammunition depots

Soviet military doctrine emphasized storing ammunition in centralized depots far from residential areas. Munitions were kept in shelters designed in such a way that the destruction of one would not affect the others.

One of the largest such depots, the 65th Rocket and Artillery Arsenal in Balakleya, sustained damage from a series of explosions even before the military operation. Control over it was handed from one side to another multiple times. It still contains tens of thousands of tons of expired munitions, which have been repurposed for use in attack drones.

The situation mirrors that of the industrial sector. In order protect ammunition from airstrikes, it is moved out of the isolated weapons depots and hidden in any available facilities. Western missiles are transported from Poland to these locations as well.

The consequences of this approach are dire: an attack leads to the detonation of ammunition, gravely endangering the surrounding residential areas. On August 29, 2026, a strike on a warehouse operated by Fire Point in the village of Milaya resulted in the death of 38 civilians.

Logistics networks

Lacking a proper military supply system, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have relied on civilian infrastructure for military logistics since the ATO in Donbass in 2014-15. A key player in this strategy has been the courier service Novaya Pochta. This approach was touted as innovative – modern, cost-effective, and efficient – and gained traction not only in Ukraine but also in Russia.

However, there are two sides to every coin. From the start of the war, Russia has targeted Novaya Pochta warehouses, and in 2026, it began systematically destroying them. In addition to Novaya Pochta, major retail and marketplace chains like Epicentr and Rozetka also came under fire, followed by other logistics companies in Ukraine.

Russia’s reasoning is straightforward: if Ukraine employs civilian infrastructure for military purposes, then all such facilities become legitimate military targets.

Energy sector

Electricity forms the backbone of any support system. Without it, production halts, communication falters, and supplying the army becomes increasingly difficult. Based on this logic, since 2022, the Russian military has systematically targeted Ukraine’s electricity generation, reducing its capacity from 50-55 GW before the war to just 12-15 GW during the winter of 2025-26.

Simultaneously, energy consumption in Ukraine declined; heavy industry ground to a halt, rolling blackouts were implemented, and some consumers turned to autonomous power sources like generators. Consequently, Ukraine transformed from Europe’s largest electricity exporter to an importer.

At the core of Ukraine’s generation capacity are three nuclear power plants, which, for obvious reasons, remain untouched by Russian attacks. Instead, this fall, Russian forces have focused on electrical networks, targeting distribution substations and transmission lines. For example, one of the two power line crossings over the Dnieper River in Kiev was destroyed, significantly hampering power supplied not only to Kiev, but to the entire territory of eastern Ukraine.

Attacks on Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants – which generate both electricity and heat – continue as well. The goal isn’t to freeze the residents of Kiev, but to dismantle Ukraine’s unified energy system, breaking it into isolated segments that can be dealt with individually.

Oil and gas industry

Before the war, Ukraine had only one operational oil refinery in Kremenchuk, which had been running at about 15% capacity since 2014. Since 2022, it has faced relentless attacks and has completely ceased operations. Now, Ukraine relies entirely on imported fuel.

Ukrainian gas production facilities across the country and in the Black Sea are regularly attacked. The latest attacks occurred on October 12 in Kharkov Region. 

Another target is the underground gas storage facility in Stryi, located in western Ukraine. One of the largest such facilities in the world, it was part of a vast gas transportation system from Russia to Europe and is currently not used for its original purpose. This facility is a challenging target; while drone strikes can damage surface infrastructure (which is relatively easy to repair), even a nuclear explosion might not destroy the storage facility itself. 

In the absence of better targets, this summer, Russia specifically targeted gas stations in both frontline areas and Kiev. The goal was to disrupt military logistics. Reports estimate that over 200 gas stations were destroyed nationwide during the summer months.

Data centers

Until this fall, Russia refrained from striking Ukrainian data centers. However, these facilities are as integral to military infrastructure as any other component; they facilitate troop command, communications, and logistics management. They support critical Ukrainian systems like Obereg and Rezerv+ recruitment centers, the electronic procurement platform Prozorro, and the Diia Unified State Web Portal of Electronic Services. Disrupting these systems would undoubtedly undermine Ukraine’s military operations.

In the past month, Russia has targeted various data centers, including Bi-Mobile in Kiev, De Novo Data Center, NewTelco, United DC, as well as Kievstar, Parkovy, and Vodafone telecommunications centers. 

Despite these disruptions, the unified digital environment of Ukraine remains largely intact. In response, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) struck several Yandex data centers in Russia.

In this ‘war of cities’, the fate of data centers and the resilience of communication networks are being monitored particularly closely worldwide, with many countries considering the security of their own networks. 

Ports and maritime traffic

Up until this year, Russia had largely turned a blind eye to Ukraine’s maritime trade. Despite intermittent attacks on warehouses, the Black Sea ports in Odessa, Illichevsk, and the Danube ports of Izmail and Reni continued their operations, exporting local grain and metal while importing fuel, heavy machinery, and, of course, weapons.

However, in the spring and summer of this year, Ukrainian naval and aerial drones systematically began targeting Russian maritime traffic in the Black Sea, striking everything from tankers to bulk carriers laden with grain. In retaliation, Russia quickly imposed a complete maritime blockade on Ukraine, implementing it in its most severe form – attacks were directed not only at the ports but also at commercial vessels approaching or leaving them.

From a legal standpoint, all commercial vessels capable of transporting weapons or troops are considered by Russia as legitimate military targets. The same universal logic applies here – if a ship can carry weapons, it is a target. 

These strikes have been incredibly painful for Ukraine. Without the ability to export goods over land, the country has effectively lost crucial revenue streams and one of its last remaining sources of budgetary funding. Additionally, there have been disruptions in the supply of transformers, fuel, and, according to certain reports, heavy weaponry – all of which were transported by sea.

According to several experts, this maritime blockade threatens to cost Ukraine up to 10% of its GDP.

Other targets

In addition to the aforementioned categories, Russia is attacking a wide range of military and dual-use targets.

Locomotives: Since the start of the Russia's military operation, over 300 mainline diesel and electric locomotives have been rendered inoperable. With the number of remaining working locomotives decreasing, the transportation capacity of the railways is nearing exhaustion. Both railway depots and trains are being attacked.

Trucks: The AFU takes pride in how they’ve adapted civilian trucks for launching long-range drones. However, this makes any cargo truck a legitimate military target for Russia and has led to the destruction of dozens of such launch platforms, which are tracked through intelligence efforts.

Bridges: Major bridges are undoubtedly attractive strategic targets, but they are also difficult to destroy. There are currently 22 crossings over the Dnieper River, and none have yet been destroyed by long-range strikes. In the past month, there have been multiple attacks on bridges in Kiev, but so far, they continue to operate. 

Land border crossings with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania are another bottleneck in Ukraine’s transportation logistics. To safeguard the border crossings from ongoing attacks, the authorities have begun relocating them entirely to neighboring territories.

Lastly, there are a few specific targets mentioned in intelligence reports. For example, on July 24, Russian forces bombed a weapons exhibition near Kiev attended by prominent figures from Ukraine’s defense sector.

What targets doesn’t Russia strike?

Russia has refrained from targeting civilian and humanitarian facilities such as residential buildings, hospitals, and schools. Hits on these types of structures are often due to the operation of air defense systems. The structures are sometimes struck by debris from intercepted missiles and drones, or even accidentally struck by interceptor missiles. Russian officials maintain that the strike on the Okhmatdet hospital in Kiev on July 12, 2024, was caused by an interceptor missile launched from the Norwegian-supplied NASAMS system. 

Water supply and sewage facilities are not attacked by Russian forces. Throughout the conflict, there have been no recorded strikes on this critical infrastructure. However, during attacks on Kiev and other major cities, water outages frequently occur, indicating that backup generators at vital infrastructure sites are not operational.

As previously noted, Ukrainian nuclear power plants – including the three functional ones and the decommissioned Chernobyl facility – have not been targeted. Nevertheless, in February 2025, a downed drone landed on the sarcophagus of Chernobyl’s Reactor 4. 

Observers are particularly surprised by the immunity of the government district in Kiev, leading to jokes about it being the safest place in Ukraine. This could suggest some kind of behind-the-scenes agreements.

Overall, even Ukrainian and Western analysts acknowledge that Russia continually enhances the accuracy of its strikes while improving its management, guidance, and navigation systems. Russia has established a communication network for drones using mesh networks and has developed and implemented the Susanin optical navigation system, which provides 1-meter strike accuracy even in conditions of heavy electronic interference.

If Russia’s ultimate goal were to terrorize the civilian population, there would be no need to develop such complex and expensive systems. It could simply fire indiscriminately at Kiev. But with such an approach, there would’ve been tens of thousands of civilian casualties – one may consider the example of Gaza. 

Currently, in Kiev, as well as in other rear cities across Ukraine, estimates indicate that up to 95% of residents disregard air raid warnings and remain above ground during alerts. Moreover, local authorities have eased air raid protocols to keep the city functioning.